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“Drive-by” Jurisdiction: Congressional
Oversight in Court
Daniel Epstein
Abstract
On July 9, 2020, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche
Bank AG, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not adequately
consider the separation of powers concerns attendant to congressional
subpoenas for presidential information. Given that the question presented
in Mazars concerned whether Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose
in subpoenaing the President’s personal records, the Supreme Court’s
decision is anything but a model of clarity. The Court simultaneously
opined that disputes “involving nonprivileged, private information” “do[ ]
not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations” while claiming
“congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit
the political branches against one another.” This essay presents a more
precise framework for adjudicating interbranch disputes. By understanding
Congress as it understands itself, this article draws a legal distinction
between congressional investigations of the private sphere versus oversight
of the Executive Branch. It analogizes Congress’s regulatory investigations
to the sorts of quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative regulatory inquiries
commonplace among federal agencies. Like regulatory inquiries by federal
agencies, subpoenas for testimony and documents are enforceable against
the private sphere. Oversight subpoenas, it is argued, are not enforceable
precisely because oversight involves political questions inappropriate for
judicial resolution. Just like in the administrative context, where regulatory

* Vice President for Legal and Policy, Trust Ventures, a venture capital firm investing in
highly regulated industries. From 2017 to 2020, Epstein was a Special Assistant and Senior
Associate Counsel to the President. From 2009 to 2011, Epstein served as a counsel for oversight
and investigations on the Committee on Oversight and Reform in the U.S. House of Representatives.
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inquiries must be purged of evidence of political taint, any regulatory
inquiry from Congress must be likewise detached from its more politicized
counterpart in the name of oversight. In this sense, the accommodation
hinted in Chief Justice Roberts’ Mazars opinion can be properly understood
as a requirement that Congress exhaust its political remedies before seeking
private ones. As such, the analytic framework presented here makes the
otherwise hard case of Mazars an easy case of identifying an improper
attempt to conduct oversight in the facade of a regulatory inquiry, one
tainted by prior political efforts and a prematurely clotured political
process.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 27, 2020, in the companion cases of Trump v. Mazars USA,
LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Supreme Court requested the
Office of Solicitor General and the parties brief “whether the political
question doctrine or related justiciability principles bear on the Court’s
adjudication of these cases.”1 This essay seeks to answer that question in the
affirmative and develops a framework for evaluating interbranch
information disputes concealed within congressional investigations of
businesses and individuals.2 Both Mazars3 and Deutsche Bank4 are similar
cases (hereinafter combined as “Mazars”)5: congressional committees
seeking from private companies (here, information about President Donald
Trump) what they could not obtain directly from the Executive Branch.6
The framework to be defended, however, relies on a set of assumptions that
will be implicitly defended through exposition of the argument below.
Those assumptions are as follows:
1) When a congressional committee makes the decision to conduct
an investigation of the Executive Branch (“congressional
oversight”), that choice commits Congress to obtaining a
political, not legal, remedy for noncompliance.7 The D.C.
Circuit’s accommodation doctrine is unsound because it
presumes interbranch information disputes are justiciable.8
1. United States Supreme Court, Order List: 590 U.S. (Apr. 27, 2020), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/042720zor_6k47.pdf.
2. A version of this essay can be found on the Yale Journal on Regulation blog. See Daniel
Epstein, Congressional Oversight Disputes as Political Questions, Part I: The Decline of the
Interbranch
Accommodation,
YALE
J.
ON
REG.
(June
8,
2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/congressional-oversight-disputes-as-political-questions-part-i-thedecline-of-the-interbranch-accommodation-doctrine-by-daniel-epstein/;
Daniel
Epstein,
Congressional Oversight Disputes as Political Questions, Part II: Accommodation as an
Intrabranch Doctrine Governing Committee Investigations, YALE J. ON REG. (June 15, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/congressional-oversight-disputes-as-political-questions-part-iiaccommodation-as-an-intrabranch-doctrine-governing-committee-investigations-by-daniel-epstein/.
3. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
4. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2019).
5. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 660 (2019).
6. Compare Mazars, 940 F.3d at 710, with Deutsche Bank, 943 F.3d at 627.
7. H.R. Rep. No. 105-830, at 137 (1998) ("The Constitution contains a single procedure for
Congress to address the fitness for office of the President of the United States—impeachment by the
House, and subsequent trial by the Senate.") (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3).
8. See Mazars, 940 F.3d at 748 (holding that a subpoena issued by Congress to Mazars was
valid and enforceable). But see id. at 784 (Rao, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution and our historical
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2) When a congressional committee makes the decision to conduct
an investigation of a non-governmental entity, that choice
permits Congress to obtain a legal remedy for noncompliance,
but only if its investigation is cabined by a legitimate legislative
(regulatory) purpose9—much in the same way that agency
investigations, as distinct from law enforcement, are cabined by
a rulemaking purpose under the Administrative Procedure
Act.10
3) Legal doctrines that apply legislative purpose requirements to
congressional oversight or deem regulatory investigations as
non-justiciable fail to properly distinguish between
“congressional oversight of administration” and “regulatory
investigations by Congress.” Both congressional oversight11
and regulatory investigations by Congress12 are creatures of
law.
Even assuming the validity of the assumptions outlined, above,
Congress would contend that the congressional suit to compel Mazars’s
compliance with its subpoena is justiciable under the “regulatory
investigation” framework because the dispute is not between the Executive
and Legislative Branches.13
This essay seeks to defend the argument that Mazars was an interbranch
practice draw a consistent line between the legislative and judicial powers of Congress. The
majority crosses this boundary for the first time by upholding this subpoena investigating the illegal
conduct of the President under the legislative power.”).
9. See id. at 783 (Rao, J. dissenting) (“While congressional oversight investigations may probe
a wide range of matters . . . such investigations may proceed ancillary to the legislative power.”).
10. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S § 551 (2020); accord. Exec. Order No. 13892,
84 Fed. Reg. 55239 & Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (stating that when investigations
proceed via jurisdictional statements that function as “legal standards,” those jurisdictional
statements are “rules” not “adjudications” under the under the Administrative Procedure Act).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Congressional oversight derives its authority from the “Rules of
Proceedings” clause, id., which is referenced as the basis for section 136 of the Legislative
Reorganization Act. 2 U.S.C. 190d (1970).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congressional investigations of non-government persons under
Congress’s authority to regulate intelligibly are pursuant to the “Necessary and Proper” clause, id.,
which first found statutory articulation in 1857 as an act entitled “An Act More Effectually to
Enforce the Attendance of Witnesses on the Summons of Either House of Congress, and to Compel
Them to Discover Testimony,” 11 Stat. 155, ch. 19 (1857).
13. Mazars, 940 F.3d at 725 (stating that the court “must determine whether Congress’s
‘legislative purpose is being served’ without taking into account either whether the investigation will
reveal, or whether the investigators are motivated to reveal, criminal conduct”).
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information dispute in the sheep’s clothing of a subpoena enforcement suit.
The argument proceeds in two steps. First, it seeks to establish clarity for
the legal framework governing congressional inquiries by showing that the
accommodation doctrine, an exhaustion and ripeness doctrine of the D.C.
Circuit, has been largely repudiated by the federal courts as an appropriate
legal doctrine for evaluating interbranch information disputes. But second,
it resurrects the accommodation doctrine as a valid doctrine for assessing
regulatory disputes between Congress and a non-governmental party when
the regulatory inquiry originated as an oversight matter, as in Mazars. This
second argument simply rearticulates what accommodation actually is:
exhaustion of the political process. This political exhaustion doctrine,
however, requires the branches to use effective government relations to
resolve disputes not as a means of ripening congressional suits against the
Executive Branch but to ensure regulatory investigations are not a backdoor
means for political oversight. In other words, the test for whether a
congressional investigation constitutes political oversight is whether political
remedies of appropriations, impeachment and removal, or elections
effectively moot the supposed harm to Congress.
II. RECENT JURISPRUDENTIAL INDICATIONS OF THE DECLINING
TENABILITY OF THE ACCOMMODATION DOCTRINE
The D.C. Circuit’s accommodation doctrine states that a duly authorized
congressional information request to the Executive Branch (“oversight”)
initiates the “implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation
. . . of the needs of the conflicting branches.”14 This back and forth between
the branches has been described by the D.C. Circuit as a constitutionallymandated process of accommodation by the parties of legislative need and
Executive Branch confidentiality interests.15 Accommodation is “mandated”
by the branches “on the expectation that where conflicts in scope of
authority arose between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic
compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in the manner most
likely to result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental
14. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
“AT&T 2”].
15. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter
“AT&T 1”]. As the AT&T 1 court explained, because the Justice Department sought an injunction
against AT&T’s compliance with a House subpoena, the court permitted the House to intervene as
“the real defendant in interest.” Id.
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system.”16
The D.C. Circuit’s February 28, 2020, McGahn decision, authored by
Judge Griffith, shreds the accommodation doctrine in a single stroke: “the
entire analysis of the House’s standing to intervene in AT&T I consists of a
single sentence, followed by no citations. ‘[D]rive-by jurisdictional rulings
of this sort’ typically ‘have no precedential effect.’”17 Judge Griffith’s
position is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. Byrd, a legislative
standing case, definitively “compels the conclusion that we lack jurisdiction
to consider lawsuits between the Legislative and Executive Branches.”18
Even the McGahn district court, whose decision to enforce the subpoena
for the testimony of the President’s counsel was reversed by the D.C.
Circuit, skeptically received arguments about accommodation, finding, “the
Court cannot accept DOJ’s present reliance on carefully curated rhetoric
concerning historical accommodations practices”.19 And certainly, Judge
Griffith, despite his deprecation of the accommodation doctrine as a tool
justifying judicial review, noted its “use” in avoiding “premature[]
involve[ment of] the courts”.20
III. ACCOMMODATION AS A THRESHOLD FOR DEPOLITICIZING CONGRESS’S
REGULATORY INVESTIGATIONS
Given judicial skepticism toward relying on accommodation as a
framework for evaluating interbranch information disputes, the federal
courts have an opportunity to reevaluate these disputes by grounding them in
constitutional and statutory text. As noted above, Congress, in formalizing
its committees, based their Executive Branch review authority as a function
of congressional rules. Only in the aftermath of the Nixon presidency was
judicial review of congressional oversight even fathomable—as noted
16. AT&T 2, 567 F.2d at 127. In AT&T 2, the D.C. Circuit held, “each branch should take
cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic
evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation.” Id.
17. Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives v. McGahn, 951 F.3d
510, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) .
18. McGahn, 951 F.3d at 526; accord. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997). Raines found
that “no suit [addressed by the D.C. Circuit] was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official
authority or power.” Id, at 826.
19. Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 173 (D.D.C. 2019).
20. McGahn, 951 F.3d at 537 (Henderson, J., concurring)..
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below, the Supreme Court, in Marshall v. Gordon, while granting review of
a dispute between a congressional committee and an Executive Branch
official, determined that a congressional rule, as opposed to a law, cannot
bind the Executive.21 A different history characterizes congressional
investigations of non-government persons and the judicial review thereof.
Congressional investigations aimed at the development of public-facing
regulatory standards were the antecedent to the modern administrative state.
Such inquiries, separate from congressional proceedings based in Article
I, § 5 (such as impeachment), are grounded in Article I, § 8’s “Necessary
and Proper” clause and first found statutory articulation in “An Act More
Effectually to Enforce the Attendance of Witnesses on the Summons of
Either House of Congress, and to Compel Them to Discover Testimony.”22
As presented before the D.C. Circuit in Mazars, the House Oversight
Committee subpoena to Mazars cited, as its authority, House Rule X, which
authorizes the Committee to “investigate ‘any matter at any time.’”23
Standing committee jurisdictional rules trace back to the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946.24 This Act grounded congressional authority to
“exercise continuous watchfulness” over the Executive Branch in the Rules
of Proceedings Clause.25 Section 101 of the Legislative Reorganization Act
states that “[t]he following sections of this title are enacted by the Congress:
. . . As an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.”26 Given this legal context, the Supreme Court has
definitively opined that resolutions derived under the Rules of Proceedings
Clause are not enforceable against the Executive Branch.27 On the two

21. 243 U.S. 521, 536 (1917) (noting that a congressional rule that binds the Executive Branch
“would be absolutely destructive of the distinction between legislative, executive and judicial
authority which is interwoven in the very fabric of the Constitution and would disregard express
limitations therein . . . [and] there is no ground whatever for assuming that any implication as to such
a power may be deduced from any grant of authority made to Congress by the Constitution”.
22. 11 Stat. 155, ch. 19 (1857).
23. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
24. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 31).
25. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 136 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190d).
26. Id. at § 101.
27. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536–37 (1917). Albeit largely dismissed by postMcGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) courts, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 182
(1880), explicitly rejected the idea that Congress could judicially enforce its contempt power as a
form of punishment against private parties; accord. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821)
(recognizing Congress’s inherent contempt power against recalcitrant witnesses).
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occasions prior to 1974 (when the Supreme Court decided Nixon28) where
Congress held Executive Branch officials in contempt (George Seward in
1869 and Snowden Marshall in 1916), both were grounded as necessary for
the purposes of considering impeachment.29
But if Congress as Executive Branch overseer versus Congress as
regulator in need of information are distinguishable as a matter of
constitutional and legal authority for purposes of judicial review, the
accommodation doctrine would lack apparent utility. The problem Mazars
introduces is that Congress may strategically target an Executive Branch
official through an otherwise garden variety regulatory investigation. The
same Oversight Committee that subpoenaed Mazars also filed suit against
the General Services Administration for access to Trump Hotel documents,30
and Oversight Committee members participated as plaintiffs in Blumenthal
et al. v. Trump,31 both cases which, like Mazars, sought judicial sanction
against the President for alleged constitutional violations. The D.C. Circuit
in Blumenthal and the D.C. district court in Cummings v. Murphy rejected
the notion that the congressional plaintiffs had standing to sue.32
The results of these cases, then, would make it difficult to argue that
cases like Mazars, involving disputes between Congress and a company,
raise the sorts of separation of powers concerns that would invoke a bar to
standing under Raines v. Byrd.33 However, not all federal information
disputes raising separation of powers questions involve a live conflict
between Congress and the Executive Branch. Questions about the scope of
presidential communications privilege or the Office of the President’s
immunity from civil discovery34 have been resolved in the context of citizen

28. United State v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (holding if “the legitimate needs of the
judicial process . . . outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing
interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch”).
29. Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1135–39
(2009) (discussing the congressional history of finding George Seward and Snowden Marshall in
contempt of Congress).
30. See Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2018).
31. See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) rev’d, 949 F.3d 14 (2020).
32. Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Cummings, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 117.
33. See Raines, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding members of Congress did not have
standing to sue over loss of political power alleged from the Line Item Veto Act giving the President
the power to strike items in a bill).
34. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004).
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suits under information access statutes,35 as well as conflicts between
presidentially-appointed investigators like Independent Counsels.36 In the
context of congressional oversight hidden within a regulatory investigation,
information law disputes between citizens with public rights against the
government provide meaningful judicial standards for the significance and
vitality of accommodation. D.C. Circuit Judge Merrick Garland’s decision
in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Secret Service “barred . . . end runs”
to seek indirectly from the President information involving “separation-ofpowers concerns” when sought directly by Congress.37 As such, Congress
should not be permitted to obtain a legal remedy by converting an oversight
matter into a regulatory investigation when the evidence reflects a
congressional failure to exhaust the political remedies available through the
oversight process. An oversight matter like Mazars could be resolved
through either, or all of, restricting the President’s power legislatively
(particularly through appropriations), impeaching and removing the
President, removing the President through the electoral process, or utilizing
public pressure to force the President to resign. When Congress pursues
oversight, then seeks to avoid a political remedy by substituting the
government target for a non-governmental one, it has failed to effectively
depoliticize its regulatory investigation.38
Politicized regulatory
investigations constitute oversight which by definition is not required to
have a legitimate rulemaking purpose.39
The accommodation principle that requires exhaustion of political
remedies prior to a legitimate regulatory investigation being ripe for judicial
review invokes several federal administrative law doctrines. First, it
incorporates a requirement that Congress “exhaust” political remedies in
making any initial choice to conduct congressional oversight before
35. See e.g. Buzzfeed, Inc. v. FBI, No. 18-cv-2567 (BAH), 2020 WL 2219246 (D.D.C. May 7,
2020).
36. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 734, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting the “difficult business of
delineating the scope and operation of the presidential communications privilege” by having to
balance the interests of “the efficacy and quality of presidential decisionmaking” with “the dangers
involved in cloaking governmental operations in secrecy”).
37. 726 F.3d 208, 225–226 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
38. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 748 (2019) (Rao, J. dissenting) (“[T]he subpoena
targets the President and raises implications for the separation of powers that the majority cannot
brush aside simply because the subpoena is addressed to the President's accountants, Mazars USA,
LLP.”)
39. See Robert Longley, Congressional Oversight and the US Government, THOUGHTCO.
(January 6, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/congressional-oversight-4177013.
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Congress can meaningfully pursue the same subject matter through a
regulatory investigation.40 Second, it applies the requirement that regulatory
decision-making be free from political taint to Congress’s regulatory
investigations.41
In order for the argument to be valid, the law of administrative agencies
must inform congressional investigations. But this move is not a difficult
one once we consider that any legislative power that can be validly
delegated to the Executive Branch is judicially reviewable as ministerial as
opposed to discretionary. The Supreme Court has long sanctioned
congressional delegation of its investigative authority to committees as
legislative agencies.42 In 1838, the Supreme Court in Kendall v. United
States crafted a distinction between congressional regulation of the
ministerial responsibilities of Executive Branch officials and the political
duties of such officials which would be immune from congressional
inspection.43 The idea that Congress can assign ministerial duties to
Executive officers and monitor their compliance with such duties is a central
ideology held by congressional oversight principals and good government
advocates.44
40. See Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 765 (1975) (“Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference
with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an
opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience
and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.”); Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics v. Am, Action Network, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2019)
(“Administrative exhaustion requirements ensure that an agency is able to take a first pass at the
facts alleged and to make determinations using its relative expertise. Exhaustion also promotes
conciliatory efforts.”).
41. See Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A]n agency must
determine, and give effect to, the decision that would have been made had politics not intruded.”).
42. For instance, legislation passed in 1879 permitted Congress to delegate its adjudication of
private claims against the United States (traditionally handled by the Committee on Claims) to a
federal trial judge. 20 Stat. 278.
43. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838) (“There are certain political duties
imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the dischcarge of which is under the
direction of the President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon
any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured
and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are
subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And this is emphatically
the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial character.”).
44. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 264–274 (1926) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); see also
Daniel Epstein, Kendall v. United States and the Inspector General Dilemma, UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE (June 22, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/22/ig-dilemma-epstein/.
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The Supreme Court, the same year that both the Legislative
Reorganization Act and the Administrative Procedure Act became law, held
that agency exercises of the “subpoena power for securing evidence” with
“the aid of the district court in enforcing it” is an “authority . . . clearly to be
comprehended in the ‘necessary and proper’ clause, as incidental to both its
general legislative and its investigative powers.”45 Thus, in no uncertain
terms, Congress’s power to conduct regulatory investigations can be
delegated to quasi-legislative agencies. The theory of accommodation
presented here, then, involves the application of administrative law
principles to regulatory investigations by Congress to ensure they are not
backdoor means of political oversight. Political exhaustion ensures that
Congress’s regulatory investigation is for a legitimate rulemaking
(legislative) purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit’s October 11, 2019 opinion in Trump v. Mazars stated,
“[t]he lesson of McGrain is that an investigation may properly focus on one
individual if that individual’s conduct offers a valid point of departure for
remedial legislation. Again, such is the case here.”46 The framework
presented here permits the distinction of Mazars from McGrain by
reintroducing “accommodation” as a test for evaluating the legitimacy of
regulatory investigations. In McGrain, the investigative target was the
brother of the former Attorney General and the political remedy—removal
of an Attorney General alleged to have engaged in wrongdoing—had
already occurred before the case reached any court.47 None of these
circumstances are present in the Mazars case. A political exhaustion
requirement for regulatory investigations by Congress ensures clarification
of justiciable conflicts between Congress and individual witnesses while
averting the need for federal courts to craft political remedies in legal terms.
Raines v. Byrd sought to prevent the judicial superintendence of the
Legislative Branch’s own power by placing courts in the position of
determining what constitutes an intrabranch informational injury.48

45. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946).
46. 940 F.3d 710, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
47. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 150–52 (1927).
48. 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (“Although the contest here is not formally between the political
branches . . . it is in substance an interbranch controversy about calibrating the legislative and
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Congress has a near limitless amount of institutional remedies for
Executive Branch noncompliance in the form of inherent contempt,
impeachment, removal, appropriations, or competitive electioneering. But
Congress’s decision to not engage in political remedies in favor of using its
investigative power should not be an opportunity for judicial paternalism as
a substitute for effective politics. Requiring Congress’s regulatory inquiries
to be free of any nexus to congressional oversight of administration and to
be untainted by the inherently political nature of oversight is not simply a
means for protecting a fair process—it prevents Congress from abdicating its
political responsibility to oversee the administrative state.

executive powers, as well as an intrabranch dispute between segments of Congress itself.
Intervention in such a controversy would risk damaging the public confidence that is vital to the
functioning of the Judicial Branch . . . by embroiling the federal courts in a power contest nearly at
the height of its political tension.”) (internal citation omitted).
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